Starting from a generalization of the standard axioms for a monoid we present a stepwise development of various, mutually equivalent foundational axiom systems for category theory. Our axiom sets have been formalized in the Isabelle/HOL interactive proof assistant, and this formalization utilizes a semantically correct embedding of free logic in classical higher-order logic. The modeling and formal analysis of our axiom sets has been significantly supported by series of experiments with automated reasoning tools integrated with Isabelle/HOL. We also address the relation of our axiom systems to alternative proposals from the literature, including an axiom set proposed by Freyd and Scedrov for which we reveal a technical issue (when encoded in free logic): either all operations, e.g. morphism composition, are total or their axiom system is inconsistent. The repair for this problem is quite straightforward, however.
Introduction
We present a stepwise development of axiom systems for category theory by generalizing the standard axioms for a monoid to a partial composition operation. Our purpose is not to make or claim any contribution to category theory but rather to show how formalizations involving the kind of logic required (free logic) can be validated within modern proof assistants. A total of eight different axiom systems is studied. The systems I-VI are shown to be equivalent. The axiom system VII slightly modifies axiom system VI to obtain (modulo notational transformation) the set of axioms as proposed by Freyd and Scedrov in their textbook "Categories, Allegories" [9] , published in 1990; see also Subsection 9.2 where we present their original system. While the axiom systems I-VI are shown to be consistent, a constricted inconsistency result is obtained for system VII (when encoded in free logic where free variables range over all objects): We can prove (∃ x . ¬(E x )) → False, where E is the existence predicate. Read this as: If there are undefined objects, e.g. the value of an undefined composition x ·y, then we have falsity. By contraposition, all objects (and thus all compositions) must exist. But when we assume the latter, then the axiom system VII essentially reduces categories to monoids. We note that axiom system V, which avoids this problem, corresponds to a set of axioms proposed by Scott [14] in the 1970s. The problem can also be avoided by restricting the variables in axiom system VII to range only over existing objects and by postulating strictness conditions. This gives us axiom system VIII.
Our exploration has been significantly supported by series of experiments in which automated reasoning tools have been called from within the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL [11] via the Sledgehammer tool [4] . Moreover, we have obtained very useful feedback at various stages from the model finder Nitpick [5] saving us from making several mistakes. At the conceptual level this paper exemplifies a new style of explorative mathematics which rests on a significant amount of human-machine interaction with integrated interactive-automated theorem proving technology. The experiments we have conducted are such that the required reasoning is often too tedious and time-consuming for humans to be carried out repeatedly with highest level of precision. It is here where cycles of formalization and experimentation efforts in Isabelle/HOL provided significant support. Moreover, the technical inconsistency issue for axiom system VII was discovered by automated theorem provers, which further emphasises the added value of automated theorem proving in this area. To enable our experiments we have exploited an embedding of free logic [13] in classical higher-order logic, which we have recently presented in a related paper [1] . We also want to emphasize that this paper has been written entirely within the Isabelle framework by utilizing the Isabelle "build" tool; cf. [15] , Section 2. It is thus an example of a formally verified mathematical document, where the PDF document as presented here has been generated directly from the verified source files mentioned above. We also note that once the proofs have been mechanically checked, they are generally easy to find by hand using paper and pencil.
Embedding of Free Logic in HOL
Free logic models partial functions as total functions over a "raw domain" D. A subset E of D is used to characterize the subdomain of "existing" objects; cf. [13] for further details. The experiments presented in the subsequent sections exploit our embedding of free logic in HOL [1] . This embedding is trivial for the standard Boolean connectives. The interesting aspect is that free logic quantifiers are guarded in the embedding by an explicit existence predicate E (associated with the subdomain E of D ), so that quantified variables range only over existing objects, while free variables and arbitrary terms may also denote undefined/nonexisting objects outside of E. This way we obtain an elegant treatment of partiality resp. undefinednes as required in category theory. In our related paper [1] we also show how definite description can be appropriately modeled in this approach. However, the definite description is not required for purposes of this paper, so we omit it. Note that the connectives and quantifiers of free logic are displayed below in bold-face fonts. Normal, non-bold-face connectives and quantifiers in contrast belong to the meta-logic HOL. The prefix "f", e.g. in fNot, stands for "free". 
Further free logic connectives can now be defined as usual.
In this framework partial and total functions are modelled as follows: A function f is total if and only if for all x we have E x → E (f x ). For partial functions f we may have some x such that E x but not E (f x ). A function f is strict if and only if for all x we have E (f x ) → E x.
Preliminaries
Morphisms in the category are objects of type i. We introduce three partial functions, dom (domain), cod (codomain), and · (morphism composition). Partiality of composition is handled exactly as expected: we generally may have non-existing compositions x ·y (i.e. ¬(E (x ·y))) for some existing morphisms x and y (i.e. E x and E y).
For composition · we assume set-theoretical composition here (i.e., functional composition from right to left). This means that
The equality symbol ∼ = denotes Kleene equality and it is defined as follows (where = is identity on all objects, existing or non-existing, of type i ):
Reasoning tools in Isabelle quickly confirm that ∼ = is an equivalence relation. But existing identity ≃, in contrast, is only symmetric and transitive, and lacks reflexivity. It is defined as:
We have:
by blast lemma x ≃ x -This does not hold; Nitpick finds a countermodel.
Next, we define the identity morphism predicate I as follows:
This definition was suggested by an exercise in [9] on p. 4. In earlier experiments we used a longer definition which can be proved equivalent on the basis of the other axioms. For monoids, where composition is total, I i means i is a two-sided identity and such are unique. For categories the property is much weaker.
Axiom Set I
Axiom Set I is our most basic axiom set for category theory generalizing the axioms for a monoid to a partial composition operation. Remember that a monoid is an algebraic structure (S, •), where • is a binary operator on set S, satisfying the following properties: Closure:
∃id S ∈ S.∀a ∈ S. id S • a = a = a • id S That is, a monoid is a semigroup with a two-sided identity element. Our first axiom set for category theory employs a partial, strict binary composition operation ·, and the existence of left and right identity elements is addressed in the last two axioms. The notions of dom (Domain) and cod (Codomain) abstract from their common meaning in the context of sets. In category theory we work with just a single type of objects (the type i of morphisms) and therefore identity morphisms are employed to suitably characterize their meanings.
Nitpick confirms that this axiom set is consistent.
1 The keyword "oops" in Isabelle/HOL indicates a failed/incomplete proof attempt; the respective (invalid) conjecture is then not made available for further use. The simplest countermodel for the conjecture given here consists of single, non-existing element.
Even if we assume there are non-existing objects we get consistency (which is e.g. not the case for Axiom Set VII below).
We may also assume an existing and a non-existing object and still get consistency.
The left-to-right direction of existence axiom E i is implied.
We can prove that the i in axiom C i is unique. The proofs can be found automatically by Sledgehammer. 3
Analogously, the provers quickly show that j in axiom D is unique.
However, the i and j need not be equal. Using the Skolem function symbols C and D this can be encoded in our formalization as follows:
Nitpick finds a model for cardinality i = 2. This model consists of two non-existing objects i 1 and i 2 . C maps both i 1 and i 2 to i 2 . D maps i 1 to i 2 , and vice versa. The composition i 2 ·i 2 is mapped to i 2 . All other composition pairs are mapped to i 1 .
Even if we require at least one existing object Nitpick still finds a model:
Again the model is of cardinality i = 2, but now we have a non-existing i 1 and and an existing i 2 . Composition · and C are as above, but D is now identity on all objects. 2 To display the models or countermodels from Nitpick in the Isabelle/HOL system interface simply put the mouse on the expression "nitpick".
3 In our initial experiments proof reconstruction of the external ATP proofs failed in Isabelle/HOL. The SMT reasoner Z3 [7] , which is employed in the smt tactic by default, was too weak. Therefore we first introduced further lemmata, which helped. However, an alternative way out, which we discovered later, has been to replace Z3 by CVC4 [8] in Isabelle's smt tactic (this can be done by stating "declare [[ smt-solver = cvc4 ]]" in the source document). In the latest version of the proof document we now suitably switch between the two SMT solvers to obtain best results.
Axiom Set II
Axiom Set II is developed from Axiom Set I by Skolemization of i and j in axioms C i and D i . We can argue semantically that every model of Axiom Set I has such functions. Hence, we get a conservative extension of Axiom Set I. This could be done for any theory with an "∀ x .∃ i ."-axiom. The strictness axiom S is extended, so that strictness is now also postulated for the new Skolem functions dom and cod. Note: the values of Skolem functions outside E can just be given by the identity function.
As above, we first check for consistency.
The left-to-right direction of existence axiom E ii is implied.
Axioms C ii and D ii , together with S ii , show that dom and cod are total functions -as intended.
Axiom Set II implies Axiom Set I. 4
4 Axiom Set I also implies Axiom Set II. This can be shown by semantical means on the meta-level. We have also attempted to prove this equivalence within Isabelle/HOL, but so far without final success. However, we succeed to prove that the following holds:
Note that the inclusion of strictness of Cod and Dom is still missing.
Axiom Set III
In Axiom Set III the existence axiom E is simplified by taking advantage of the two new Skolem functions dom and cod.
E (x ·y) ← (dom x ∼ = cod y ∧ E (cod y)) and A iii : -Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼ = (x ·y)·z and C iii : -Codomain:
E y → (I (cod y) ∧ (cod y)·y ∼ = y) and
The obligatory consistency check is positive.
lemma
The left-to-right direction of existence axiom E iii is implied.
Moreover, Axiom Set II is implied.
A side remark on the experiments: All proofs above and all proofs in the rest of this paper have been obtained fully automatically with the Sledgehammer tool in Isabelle/HOL. This tool interfaces to prominent first-order automated theorem provers such as CVC4 [8] , Z3 [7] , E [12] and Spass [3] . Remotely, also provers such as Vampire [10] , or the higher-order provers Satallax [6] and LEO-II [2] can be reached. For example, to prove lemma E iii FromII we have called Sledgehammer on all postulated axioms of the theory:
The provers then, via Sledgehammer, suggested to call trusted/verified tools in Isabelle/HOL with the exactly required dependencies they detected. In lemma E iii FromII, for example, all axioms from Axiom Set II are required. With the provided dependency information the trusted tools in Isabelle/HOL were then able to reconstruct the external proofs on their own. This way we obtain a verified Isabelle/HOL document in which all the proofs have nevertheless been contributed by automated theorem provers.
Axiom Set II also implies Axiom Set III. Hence, both theories are equivalent. The only interesting case is lemma E iii FromII, the other cases are trivial.
using D ii by auto 7 Axiom Set IV Axiom Set IV simplifies the axioms C iii and D iii . However, as it turned out, these simplifications also require the existence axiom E iii to be strengthened into an equivalence.
E (x ·y) ↔ (dom x ∼ = cod y ∧ E (cod y)) and A iv : -Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼ = (x ·y)·z and C iv : -Codomain:
(cod y)·y ∼ = y and D iv : -Domain:
The obligatory consistency check is again positive. The Axiom Set III is implied. The only interesting cases are lemmata C iii FromIV and D iii FromIV. Note that the strengthened axiom E iv is used here.
Vice versa, Axiom Set III implies Axiom Set IV. Hence, both theories are equivalent. The interesting cases are lemmata E iv FromIII, C iv FromIII and D iv FromIII.
Axiom Set V has been proposed by Scott [14] in the 1970s. This set of axioms is equivalent to the axiom set presented by Freyd and Scedrov in their textbook "Categories, Allegories" [9] when encoded in free logic, corrected/adapted and further simplified. Their axiom set is technically flawed when encoded in our given context. This issue has been detected by automated theorem provers with the same technical infrastructure as employed so far. See the subsequent section for more details. We have modified the axioms of [9] by replacing the original Kleene equality ∼ = in axiom S3 by the non-reflexive, existing identity ≃. Note that the modified axiom S3 is equivalent to E iv ; see the mutual proofs below.
E (cod y) → E y and S3 : -Existence:
E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y and S4 : -Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼ = (x ·y)·z and S5 : -Domain:
x ·(dom x ) ∼ = x and S6 : -Codomain:
(cod y)·y ∼ = y
The obligatory consistency check is again positive. The Axiom Set IV is implied. The only interesting cases are lemmata E iv FromV and E iv FromV.
Vice versa, Axiom Set IV implies Axiom Set V. Hence, both theories are equivalent.
lemma S1FromV : E (dom x ) → E x using S iv by blast lemma S2FromV : E (cod y) → E y using S iv by blast lemma S3FromV : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y using E iv by metis
using D iv by blast lemma S6FromV : (cod y)·y ∼ = y using C iv by blast 9 Axiom Sets VI and VII
The axiom set of Freyd and Scedrov from their textbook "Categories, Allegories" [9] becomes inconsistent in our free logic setting if we assume non-existing objects of type i, respectively, if we assume that the operations are non-total. Freyd and Scedrov employ a different notation for dom x and cod x. They denote these operations by ✷x and x ✷. Moreover, they employ diagrammatic composition (f ·g) x ∼ = g(f x ) (functional composition from left to right) instead of the set-theoretic definition (f ·g) x ∼ = f (g x ) (functional composition from right to left) used so far. We leave it to the reader to verify that their axiom system corresponds to the axiom system given below modulo an appropriate conversion of notation. 5 In Subsection 9.2 we will also analyze their axiom system using their original notation. A main difference in the system by Freyd and Scedrov to our Axiom Set V from above concerns axiom S3. Namely, instead of the non-reflexive ≃, they use Kleene equality ∼ =, cf. definition 1.11 on page 3 of [9] . 6 The difference seems minor, but in our free logic setting it has the effect to cause the mentioned constricted inconsistency issue. This could perhaps be an oversight, or it could indicate that Freyd and Scedrov actually mean the Axiom Set VIII below (where the variables in the axioms range over defined objects only). However, in Axiom Set VIII we had to (re-)introduce explicit strictness conditions to ensure equivalence to the Axiom Set V by Scott.
Axiom Set VI
A1 : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y and A2a: cod (dom x ) ∼ = dom x and A2b: dom(cod y) ∼ = cod y and A3a: x ·(dom x ) ∼ = x and A3b: (cod y)·y ∼ = y and A4a: dom(x ·y) ∼ = dom((dom x )·y) and A4b: cod (x ·y) ∼ = cod (x ·(cod y)) and
The obligatory consistency checks are again positive. But note that this only holds when we use ≃ instead of ∼ = in A1.
lemma True -Nitpick finds a model nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms, show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True -Nitpick finds a model
Axiom Set VI implies Axiom Set V.
using A3a by blast lemma S6FromVI : (cod y)·y ∼ = y using A3b by blast Note, too, that Axiom Set VI is redundant. For example, axioms A4a and A4b are implied from the others. This kind of flaw in presenting axioms in our view is a more serious oversight. The automated theorem provers can quickly reveal such redundancies.
using A1 A2b A3b A5 by metis Our attempts to further reduce the axioms set (A1 A2a A2b A3a A3b A5 ) were not successful. Alternatively, we can e.g. keep A4a and A4b and show that axioms A2a and A2b are implied.
lemma A2aRedundant : cod (dom x ) ∼ = dom x using A1 A3a A3b A4a A4b by smt lemma A2bRedundant : dom(cod y) ∼ = cod y using A1 A3a A3b A4a A4b by smt Again, attempts to further reduce the set (A1 A3a A3b A4a A4b A5 ) were not successful.
Other reduced sets of axioms we identified in experiments are (A1 A2a A3a A3b A4b A5 ) and (A1 A2b A3a A3b A4a A5 ). Attempts to remove axioms A1, A3a, A3b, and A5 from Axiom Set VI failed. Nitpick shows that they are independent. However, when assuming strictness of dom and cod, the axioms A2a, A2b, A4a and A4b are all implied. Hence, under this assumptions, the reasoning tools quickly identify (A1 A3a A3b A5 ) as a minimal axiom set, which then exactly matches the Axiom Set V from above. 7
Axiom Set V implies Axiom Set VI. Hence, both theories are equivalent.
by (metis S1 S2 S3 S5 ) lemma A2bFromV : dom(cod y) ∼ = cod y using S1 S2 S3 S6 by metis lemma A3aFromV : x ·(dom x ) ∼ = x using S5 by blast lemma A3bFromV : (cod y)·y ∼ = y using S6 by blast lemma A4aFromV : dom(x ·y) ∼ = dom((dom x )·y)
by (metis S1 S3 S4 S5 S6 ) lemma A4bFromV : cod (x ·y) ∼ = cod (x ·(cod y))
by (metis S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 ) lemma A5FromV : x ·(y·z ) ∼ = (x ·y)·z using S4 by blast
Axiom Set VII
We now study the constricted inconsistency in Axiom Set VI when replacing ≃ in A1 by ∼ =.
We call this Axiom Set VII. This set corresponds modulo representational transformation to the axioms as presented by Freyd and Scedrov. Remember, however, that the free variables are ranging here over all objects, defined or undefined. Below, when we study Axiom Set VIII, we will restrict the variables to range only over existing objects. A model can still be constructed if we do not make assumptions about non-existing objects.
In fact, the model presented by Nitpick consists of a single, existing morphism. However, one can see directly that axiom A1 is problematic as written: If x and y are undefined, then (presumably) dom x and cod y are undefined as well, and by the definition of Kleene equality, dom x ∼ = cod y. A1 stipulates that x ·y should be defined in this case, which appears unintended. We shall see that the consequences of this version of the axiom are even stronger. It implies that all objects are defined, that is, composition (as well as dom and cod) become total operations. The theory described by these axioms "collapses" to the theory of monoids. (If all objects are defined, then one can conclude from A1 that dom x ∼ = dom y (resp. dom x ∼ = cod y and cod x ∼ = cod y), and according to 1.14 of [9] , the category reduces to a monoid provided that it is not empty.) In fact, the automated theorem provers quickly prove falsity when assuming a non-existing object of type i. The provers identify the axioms A1, A2a and A3a to cause the problem under this assumption.
Hence, all morphisms must be defined in theory of Axiom Set VII, or in other words, all operations must be total.
lemma ∀ x . E x using InconsistencyAutomaticVII by auto
The constricted inconsistency proof can be turned into an interactive mathematical argument:
shows False proof − -Let a be an undefined object obtain a where 1 : ¬(E a) using NEx by auto -We instantiate axiom A3a with a. have 2 : a·(dom a) ∼ = a using A3a by blast -By unfolding the definition of ∼ = we get from 1 that a·(dom a) is not defined. This is easy to see, since if a·(dom a) were defined, we also had that a is defined, which is not the case by assumption.
have 3 : ¬(E (a·(dom a))) using 1 2 by metis -We instantiate axiom A1 with a and dom a.
by blast -We instantiate axiom A2a with a. have 5 : cod (dom a) ∼ = dom a using A2a by blast -We use 5 (and symmetry and transitivity of ∼ =) to rewrite the right-hand of the equivalence 4 into dom a ∼ = dom a.
have 6 : E (a·(dom a)) ↔ dom a ∼ = dom a using 4 5 by auto -By reflexivity of ∼ = we get that a·(dom a) must be defined. have 7 : E (a·(dom a)) using 6 by blast -We have shown in 7 that a·(dom a) is defined, and in 3 that it is undefined. Contradiction. then show ?thesis using 7 3 by blast qed
We present the constricted inconsistency argument once again, but this time in the original notation of Freyd and Scedrov. Again, the automated theorem provers via Sledgehammer find the constricted inconsistency very quickly and they identify the exact dependencies.
lemma InconsistencyAutomatic: (∃ x . ¬(E x )) → False by (metis A1 A2a A3a)
The following alternative interactive proof is slightly shorter than the one presented above.
lemma InconsistencyInteractive: assumes NEx : ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows False proof − -Let a be an undefined object obtain a where 1 : ¬(E a) using assms by auto -We instantiate axiom A3a with a. have 2 : (✷a)·a ∼ = a using A3a by blast -By unfolding the definition of ∼ = we get from 1 that (✷a)·a is not defined. This is easy to see, since if (✷a)·a were defined, we also had that a is defined, which is not the case by assumption.
have 3 : ¬(E ((✷a)·a)) using 1 2 by metis -We instantiate axiom A1 with ✷a and a. have 4 : E ((✷a)·a) ↔ (✷a)✷ ∼ = ✷a using A1 by blast -We instantiate axiom A2a with a. have 5 : (✷a)✷ ∼ = ✷a using A2a by blast -From 4 and 5 we obtain (E ((✷a)·a)) by propositional logic. have 6 : E ((✷a)·a) using 4 5 by blast -We have ¬(E ((✷a)·a)) and E ((✷a)·a), hence Falsity. then show ?thesis using 6 3 by blast qed
Obviously Axiom Set VII is also redundant, and we have previously reported on respective redundancies [1] . However, this was before the discovery of the above constricted inconsistency issue, which tells us that the system (in our setting) can even be reduced to A1, A2a and A3a (when we additionally assume NEx ).
Axiom Set VIII
We study the axiom system by Freyd and Scedrov once again. However, this time we restrict the free variables in their system to range over existing objects only. By employing the free logic universal quantifier ∀ we thus modify Axiom Set VII as follows:
Vive versa, Axiom Set V implies Axiom Set VIII. Hence, both theories are equivalent. S1 : -Strictness: E (dom x ) → E x and S2 : -Strictness: E (cod y) → E y and S3 : -Existence:
(cod y)·y ∼ = y lemma B0a: E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y) using S1 S2 S3 by blast lemma B0b: E (dom x ) → E x using S1 by blast lemma B0c: E (cod x ) → E x using S2 by blast Again, note the relation and similarity of the reduced Axiom Set VIII to Axiom Set V by Scott, which we prefer, since it avoids a mixed use of free and bound variables in the encoding and since it is smaller.
